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Are the Better Educated Less Likely to Support Militancy and Terrorism? 
Women Are. 





I use 2009 public opinion survey data from Pakistan to show that the relationship between 
education and support for terrorism varies by gender. Specifically: 1) as women become 
more educated, they are less likely to support militancy relative to similarly educated men, 
whereas uneducated women are more likely to support militancy relative to uneducated men, 
controlling for religiosity, demographics, region, and terrorist events in the district; 2) the 
effect of women’s education is driven by the years of schooling immediately preceding and 
following high school; 3) educated women have more negative views of the United States 
and are more likely to support terror attacks against the U.S. relative to educated men, and 
uneducated women have more positive views of the United States relative to uneducated 
men. I discuss possible omitted factors which could explain the results, and use the Altonji 
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1. Introduction 
 Terrorism emerging from Pakistan poses a threat to the rest of the world, and afflicts 
Pakistan itself, resulting in great loss of life (4447 people were killed in 476 major terrorist 
incidents in Pakistan in 2011
i
), and contributing to economic and political instability. Chief 
amongst the factors which enable terrorist groups to survive and function in any context are 
support and sympathy for these groups and their goals within the population and elements of 
the government. Support for militancy and terrorism can range from a set of passive activities 
to active participation. It ranges from condoning militant behavior and sympathy or 
agreement with the views and goals of terrorist groups to letting militants live in the 
community, harboring them, encouraging militant activity, and offering financial or logistical 
support to terrorist groups, etc. The fact that Osama bin Laden lived in a city like Abbottabad 
for years implies that he had at least the tacit support of some civilians and officials around 
him.  
Why does support matter? It is logical that financial, logistical, and operational 
support for terrorism and militant groups is essential to these groups’ operation and survival. 
Moreover, given that in many cases there are substantial monetary rewards for handing over 
terrorists to the authorities, even passive sympathy with militants living in the community is 
instrumental in allowing terrorist groups to persist. In addition, while only a tiny fraction of 
sympathizers or supporters go on to join any terrorist or militant organization, purportedly 
under great duress or extenuating circumstances, support is also a necessary first condition 
for potential recruitment. Support is also required from the families of recruits, since their 
permission (particularly the blessing of mothers) is sought before joining the organization 
and especially prior to a suicide mission (Abou Zahab 2007).  
This paper uses public opinion data from Pakistan to identify the determinants of 
support for terrorist and militant groups and their goals (I treat the terms support for terrorism 
and terror groups interchangeably with support for militancy and militant groups). The 
United States and a host of other developed countries have committed a great deal of 
economic and development assistance to Pakistan based on the (unproven) conventional 
wisdom that the less educated and the poor are more likely to support terrorist organizations 
(and to be recruited by these organizations)
ii
. As part of the Enhanced Partnership with 
Pakistan Act of 2009, informally called the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act, the U.S. committed to 
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providing $7.5 billion in development assistance to Pakistan from 2009 to 2014, a sum 
renewable for the next five years. In congressional testimony, then Ambassador Richard 
Holbrooke (2009) urged lawmakers to “target the economic and social roots of extremism in 
western Pakistan with more economic aid.” Additional testimony claimed that this aid would 
help in “…countering radicalization by providing economic, social, educational, and 
vocational opportunities and life skills training to at-risk youth.” (U.S. Senate 2009) 
There are two assumptions underlying the above statements: one, those less educated 
(and poor) are more likely to become terrorists, and two, the less educated (and poor) are 
more likely to support militancy and terrorism. It is assumed that aid will improve education 
and incomes, and the conventional wisdom is that this will in turn reduce recruitment 
towards and support for terrorism
iii
. The United States also hopes that aid will win over 
Pakistani hearts and minds and shift negative views of the U.S. While the evidence on aid 
effectiveness itself is unclear, the two assumptions outlined above also do not hold up against 
empirical tests. To identify the demographic factors which are associated with terrorist 
recruitment, biographical information on terrorists is required, random or representative 
samples of which are difficult to procure. This data is then compared to the population from 
which these terrorists originate. Analyses using data on terrorist groups such as Hezbollah, 
al-Qaeda, and Jewish underground groups (Krueger 2007) as well as Pakistani terror groups 
(Abou-Zahab 2007, Fair 2008) conclude that poverty and lack of education do not explain 




This paper focuses on testing the relationship between education and support for 
terrorism, as well as Pakistanis’ views of the U.S. It is the first in the literature to examine the 
determinants of support for terrorism and views of the United States in one place. Support for 
terrorism can be measured using survey data on views on militancy and terrorism. Polling 
surveys also typically contain information on demographics, which allow for identifying 
correlations of views with demographics. However, respondent-level data is not always 
released, resulting in analyses limited to basic summary statistics and cross-tabulations. The 
representativeness of the survey is an important quality concern. In particular, surveys and 
polls may suffer from high nonresponse rates (the percentage of the original sample which 
refuses to respond to the entire survey). In addition, surveys on sensitive issues usually suffer 
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from high rates of abstention from answering particularly delicate questions. In particular, 
respondents who abstain from answering (because of fear of negative repercussions) may 
have systematically chosen one of the responses, resulting in biased analysis based on such 
data. To compound the problem, particular demographic groups (women, the illiterate) may 
systematically abstain from responding, resulting in biased correlations with demographics.  
A relatively recent but growing literature examines the determinants of support for 
terrorism using polling data in various contexts and concludes that poverty and lack of 
education do not explain support for terrorism
v
 (Krueger 2007). It is important to note that 
supportive or sympathetic views toward militancy may not necessarily translate into 
operational or financial support for militant groups, but given that representative information 
on the latter is almost impossible to procure, using expressions of support in surveys is the 
best we can do. 
In Pakistan, the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) fielded four 
surveys between 2007 and 2009, questioning respondents in depth on a range of issues 
related to militancy and terrorist groups. In February 2007 and September 2008, 
questionnaires were fielded in both rural and urban areas in collaboration with START (the 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism) to 1243 and 
1200 respondents, respectively. In September 2007, a survey was conducted in collaboration 
with USIP (the United States Institute of Peace) in urban areas, interviewing 907 
respondents.  
While these three polls ask very important questions, they suffer from a high 
percentage (20-30%) of “don’t know/no response” answers to many of the delicate questions. 
Basic cross-tabulations show that respondents of various demographics (women, the less 
educated) systematically choose the abstention response more often than other respondents, 
meaning that any analysis that correlates demographics with opinions will be biased, 
especially if we also assume that abstaining respondents would have chosen to respond in a 
particular way, differently from those who did respond. Using the September 2007 data, 
Shapiro and Fair (2010) showed that poverty, education and religiosity do not explain 
support for militant groups.  
 The PIPA May 2009 survey is a particularly good source of data, because it is 
nationally representative and has a very low abstention rate (“don’t know/no response” 
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answers) to delicate questions (less than 10% for most questions). The low abstention rates 
were achieved by working with an expert survey organization in Pakistan, which rigorously 
pre-tested the survey instrument with respondents. In addition, the translation of the 
questionnaire into Urdu was based on learning from past experiences with similar survey 
questions; for example, respondents did not necessarily readily understand what al-Qaeda 
referred to (qaeda means book or guide in Urdu), but the phrase Bin Laden ki tanzeem (Bin 
Laden’s organization) was easily understood, and therefore used in the 2009 survey. 
This paper is the first to study the PIPA 2009 survey data at the individual respondent 
level to identify the determinants of support for terrorist groups and militancy. The analytical 
work using the data to date shows provincial variation in views and an aggregate shift against 
militants relative to the 2007 poll (Fair 2009a, 2009b). Support for militancy and terrorism is 
quantified using three questions which include asking respondents to state their views of a 
Taliban takeover of Pakistan, and to describe their general feelings toward bin Laden and al-
Qaeda. In addition, views of the United States are measured using two additional questions 
which ask respondents about views of the current United States government and support for 
al-Qaeda attacks on the U.S.  
Recall that the existing literature finds that education does not explain support for 
terrorism. However, this literature fails to examine and separate out the relationship between 
views on terrorism and different types of schooling (for example, public versus private), 
education for different sub-groups (for example, girls versus boys), or non-monotonic effects 
of higher levels of education. An insignificant aggregate effect of years of education may be 
masking significant variations for different sub-groups.  
In particular, views of militancy may vary by gender in Pakistan. The actions of 
militant groups affect men and women differently. The policies of the Pakistan Taliban are 
much more harmful for women in the areas where it holds sway, in the FATA and the 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province in Pakistan (as were those of the Afghan Taliban in 
Afghanistan). The Taliban bans women from working and burns down girls’ schools. 
Women and men have different opinions on related national security issues in other contexts 
as well. In the United States, women are shown to be more concerned about terrorism 
(Gallup 2011) relative to men, and to be less supportive of defense spending than men 
(Eichenberg and Stoll 2012). 
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The relationship between education, gender, and views on militancy remains, until 
this paper, unexamined. The policies of the Taliban and militant groups in Pakistan adversely 
affect educated women in particular, since they are the ones more likely to be working or 
educating their daughters. In contrast, the policies are less likely to affect men of different 
education levels differently. In addition, public education (currently accounting for 70% of 
education provision) is segregated by gender in Pakistan. The central contribution of this 
paper is to establish that the relationship between education and support for terrorism varies 
by gender.  
Existing research on the determinants of views of militancy also fails to take into 
account the respondents’ reaction to local terrorist events and fatalities (other than concurrent 
work by Blair, Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro (2012), which uses different datasets for both 
support for militancy and terrorist events). I account for terrorist events in each respondent’s 
district in 2008 (the year before the PIPA 2009 survey) using data from the Global Terrorism 
Database. 
In ordered probit regressions, I relate each of the five outcome measures of views on 
militancy and of the United States, detailed below, to respondents’ gender, age, education, 
and income, controlling for local population and provincial differences. The results confirm 
the findings of the existing literature, and education overall appears unrelated to support for 
terrorism and views of the U.S. I then account for gender differences in the relationship 
between education and public opinion on terrorism. I find that as women become more 
educated, they are less likely to support militancy and terrorism relative to similarly educated 
men, whereas uneducated women are more likely to support militancy and terrorism relative 
to uneducated men, controlling for personal religiosity, demographics and region, and 
accounting for terrorist events in the district using data from the Global Terrorism Database. 
The effect of women’s education is driven by the secondary years of schooling, and the first 
couple of years of college. The gender-education result reverses when it comes to views of 
the United States, so that educated women have more negative views of the U.S. relative to 
educated men. This is likely due to increased awareness of violations of Pakistan’s 
sovereignty due to, among other events, U.S. drone strikes. I also examine the perception of 
threats to Pakistan posed by militant groups. While demographics are only weakly related to 
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threat perceptions, local terrorist events directly increase the perception of the threat posed by 
specific militant groups.  
I then attempt to disentangle whether the observed results reflect a causal effect of 
education or an underlying correlation. The literature to date establishes associations and 
does not tackle the difficult issue of causation, which is required to make policy 
prescriptions. I break ground by laying out the theoretical case for both correlation and 
causation, and then employ a well-established technique from the economics literature 
(Altonji Elder Taber 2005) to show that a causal story is in fact plausible. Nevertheless, more 
in-depth research is needed to firmly establish the real differences between boys’ and girls’ 
schooling, and their effects on support for terrorism, in Pakistan. 
The next section contains a detailed description of the data used in the paper, along 
with some descriptive statistics and basic cross-tabulation graphs. The regression analysis, 
which establishes the main results of the paper, follows in Section 3. In Section 4, I run some 
robustness checks. Section 5 lays out the case for correlation and causation, and describes the 
Altonji Elder Taber (2005) method for assessing the validity of a causal interpretation of the 
results. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
2.1 Data 
This paper uses individual respondent level data from the May 2009 survey 
conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes. The survey was carried out by 
SEDCO (Socio-Economic Development Consultants, Islamabad, Pakistan), with the 
questionnaire developed by PIPA. All interviewing was conducted in Urdu, with 1,000 face-
to-face interviews conducted across 64 primary sampling units in rural areas and 36 in urban 
areas; ten respondents were surveyed in each sampling unit (PIPA reports that the sampling 
error for a sample of this size is approximately +/-3.2 percentage points). Interviews were 
conducted between May 17 and 28, 2009. Baluchistan was oversampled, therefore sampling 
weights are utilized in the analysis.  
The terrorist events data is from the Global Terrorism Database (the GTD), which 
compiles information on terrorist incidents world-wide from 1970 to 2010 using newspaper 
reports. For each GTD incident, information is available on the date and location of the 
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incident, weapons used and the nature of the target, number of casualties, and (when 
identifiable) the group or individual responsible. To match the locality level GTD data to the 
individual level PIPA data, I aggregated the GTD incidents from the locality to the district 
level, corresponding to each of the districts represented in the PIPA survey. In particular, I 
use data on the total number of people who were wounded and who died in terrorist attacks 
in each district in 2008. 
For incidents to be included in the GTD, the following criteria must be fulfilled: 1) 
the incident must be intentional; 2) the incident must entail some level of violence or threat 
of violence; and 3) the perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors. In addition, 
at least 2 of the following 3 criteria must be met: 1) the act must be aimed at attaining a 
political, economic, religious, or social goal; 2) there must be evidence of an intention to 
coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the 
immediate victims; and 3) the action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare 
activities.  
2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
2.2.1 Support for Militancy 
Tables 1A through 1C contain tabulations of the responses for each of the measures I 
use to quantify support for militant groups. The first question (Table 1A) asks the respondent 
whether the Pakistan Taliban taking control over Pakistan would be a very good, good, bad, 
or very bad thing. I interpret ‘very good’ as high support for the Pakistan Taliban, ‘very bad’ 
as lack of support, and the movement from very good to very bad as declining support for the 
group. 67% of respondents think the Pakistan Taliban taking control of the country would be 
a very bad thing
vi
.  
The Pakistan Taliban operates mainly within Pakistan, mostly harming Pakistanis. 
Therefore this question should accurately reflect ‘raw’ views of militant violence and support 
for terror groups, without being conflated with negative views of other terrorist targets, such 
as the United States. Most analyses of polls in other contexts look only at views of terrorist 
acts affecting other populations - consider, as an example, questions which ask Palestinians 
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It is important to note that this survey was undertaken at a time, in May 2009, and in a 
context where there was a great deal of militant violence targeting Pakistani civilians in many 
parts of Pakistan, much of it perpetrated by the Pakistani Taliban. Consider the September 
2008 bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, which killed at least 54 and wounded at 
least 266 people, the majority Pakistani civilians.  Immediately preceding the survey, the 
Swat conflict between the Pakistan Taliban and the military was taking place, killing scores 
and displacing thousands. This analysis should be viewed in that context.  
Table 1B shows the responses to the questions measuring feelings toward bin Laden 
and al-Qaeda, respectively. Responses range from very positive to very negative, and I 
interpret ‘very positive’ as high support for the group or its leader, ‘very negative’ as lack of 
support, and moving from very positive to very negative as declining support. A more sizable 
group (about 12%) abstains from answering this question, relative to the other questions in 
the May 2009 poll. What is most notable about the responses is the relatively equal spread in 
each category, other than ‘very positive’. 
Table 1C presents two questions which measure respondents’ views of the United 
States and views of terrorism against the U.S. The first question asks about feelings toward 
the current U.S. government. 58% of respondents viewed the current U.S. administration 
unfavorably in May 2009. The second question asks respondents to choose whether they: 1) 
support al-Qaeda attacks against the United States and share al-Qaeda’s values, 2) oppose al-
Qaeda attacks against the U.S. but share al-Qaeda’s values, or 3) oppose both. I interpret 
support/share as high support for terrorism against the U.S., oppose both as lack of support 
toward terrorism against the U.S., and movement from support/share to oppose/oppose as 
declining support for terrorism against the U.S. Because these responses are two-
dimensional, I also treat each of the responses separately as dummy variables in my 
econometric analysis. It is disconcerting that an almost equal number of respondents identify 
themselves in each of the categories (with a 13% DK/NR rate); in particular, note that 25% 
of respondents say that they support al-Qaeda attacks against the U.S. and share al-Qaeda’s 
values.  
The five PIPA questions identified above constitute the five main outcome variables 
in the regression analysis. Note that when I refer to support for terrorism in the remainder of 
the paper, I refer specifically to the three questions in Tables 1A and 1B; when I refer to 
 
 
  10 
 
views of the U.S. and support for terrorism against the U.S., I refer to the two questions in 
Table 1C. Also, any individuals who do not respond to the questions I use are dropped from 
the subsequent analysis. 
2.2.2 Perceptions of Threats 
Table 1D tabulates the responses to the questions on threats faced by Pakistan. In 
three separate questions, respondents are asked whether each of the following groups: 1) 
Islamic militants and local Taliban in FATA, 2) al-Qaeda, and 3) religious militant groups in 
general, is a critical threat faced by Pakistan in the next 10 years, an important but not critical 
threat, or not a threat. Notably, 80% of respondents think Islamic militants and local Taliban 
are a critical threat to Pakistan, 82% think the same for al-Qaeda, and 67% for religious 
militants. The number is lowest for religious militants in general, implying that a general 
grouping is considered a lesser threat than specific groups, which makes sense. While these 
questions are not directly interpretable as support for militant groups or lack thereof, I will 
specifically test whether the perceptions of militant group threats change based on local 
terrorist events. 
2.2.3 Education, Age, and Income 
I present three sets of descriptive statistics on education, describing the PIPA sample 
as well as the population in general. Table 2A shows the education levels for PIPA 
respondents and compares these to the population at large, using the 1998 census data. PIPA 
respondents are asked to select which of the following education categories best describes the 
level of education they have completed: Illiterate, Elementary school or less, Some 
Secondary, Secondary, Some College, and College
vii
. 35% of PIPA respondents in 2009 had 
completed elementary school or less, while 50% had some secondary or a completed 
secondary degree. While PIPA respondents seem more educated relative to the population 
(from the Census), this is probably largely due to the different time periods: there was a well-
documented increase in schooling in Pakistan in the time period between 1998 and 2009 
(Andrabi et al 2007). Table 2B presents literacy ratios for men and women in the PIPA 
sample and in the Census, while Table 2C shows education levels for men and women in the 
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PIPA sample. Both tables reaffirm the fact that Pakistani women are less educated than men, 
and more women are at lower ends of the education level distribution than men.  
At this point, it is worth briefly summarizing the educational landscape in Pakistan. 
Currently, about 70% of student enrollment is in schools run by the government and 
segregated by gender (both in terms of students as well as teachers) and 29% in mainly co-
educational private schools (the majority of these are very low cost, rural, primary schools). 
Religious madrassas account for 1-3% of enrollment (Andrabi et al (2007, 2006), Lloyd, 
Mete, and Grant (2005, 2007)). There has been a rapid rise in primary private school 
enrollment as the numbers of these schools have multiplied since the mid-nineties. 
Summary statistics for PIPA respondents’ age and self-reported monthly household 
income in 2009 (both ordinal categorical variables since the respondents are asked to choose 
which category best represents them) are presented in Table 3A. About 70% of the 
respondents are between 16 and 39 years of age. This implies that most of the respondents 
were educated in the 1980s and 1990s, and some in the 2000s. Therefore, close to all the 
respondents are likely to have been educated in public schools, since the percentage enrolled 
in private schools was very small until the mid-1990s (and even now is primarily 
concentrated in primary schools). The PIPA survey does not ask respondents to identify 
whether they studied in a public or private school, but this is a useful question for future 
surveys. Table 3A also shows that almost 75% of respondents have a self-reported monthly 
household income ranging between Rs.3000 and Rs.15000, which in 2009 was equivalent to 
between $35 and $180.  
Table 3B summarizes personal religiosity, which shows little variability: 48.5% 
percent of respondents identify themselves as very religious, while 40.1% identify 
themselves as somewhat religious.  
Finally, summary statistics for local population (specifically, the population of the 
primary sampling unit) and the total number of people who were wounded and killed in 
terrorist attacks in PIPA districts are presented in Table 3C. 
2.2.4 Cross-tabulations 
Figure 1 is a set of five graphs which display the cross-tabulation of each of the main 
outcome variables with education levels. The outcome variables are recoded as binary to be 
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interpreted directly as support for militancy, and I graph (the bivariate relationship of) each 
variable against education levels, increasing from left to right on the bar graph. If there were 
a negative relationship between education and support for terrorism, the bars would decline 
as education increases from illiterate to college (left to right). However, the graphs do not 
reflect such a relationship. For most of the variables, the relationship is non-monotonic, with 
one exception (which runs against expectations): more educated respondents are more likely 
to support al-Qaeda attacks against the U.S. 
3. Regressions 
3.1 Empirical Strategy  
The main specification used in this paper is as follows: 
                                     (           )              
                                                  ,  
where a separate regression is run for each of the five outcome variables identified above,    .  
The issue with using cross-sectional data is that omitted variables such as intelligence 
and family background could drive both education and public opinion. This means that we 
cannot easily interpret the results as the causal effect of education on views of militancy. 
Girls who get more schooling could belong to more progressive families compared to boys 
who get more education; belonging to such a family could also account for less support of 
terrorism. Intelligence could also be more of a factor in girls getting educated relative to boys 
(parents may educate all their sons but only their most intelligent daughters); intelligence 
could in turn drive opinions on terrorism. What kind of data can best be used to establish 
causality in this context? If we had individual level panel data, fixed effects would be able to 
correct or account for both intelligence and family background, but education is unlikely to 
vary for the same adult over time (children are not surveyed in public opinion polls), making 
its effect of education impossible to identify. To properly account for family background, we 
could use household level data where we could examine differences in the education of 
individuals within the household (one way to control for individual intelligence would be to 
ask parents about their perceptions of their children’s intelligence and ability). 
A concern with household data is that while education decisions for girls are made in 
their parental household, at the time of a household survey these women are usually living in 
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their marital household, and the family background captured may be different from that of 
the parental household. However, one can account for this by asking questions about the 
parental household, and also questioning unmarried girls living with their parents. This is a 
useful survey strategy to consider for future research. 
In Sections 4 and 5, I run a number of robustness checks on the empirical work and 
lay out the case for both correlation and causation, and use the Altonji Elder Taber (2005) 
method to argue that a causal story seems plausible in this context.  
3.2 Baseline Regression 
Table 4 presents the baseline regression results relating support for terrorism and 
views of the United States to gender, age, education, and income, controlling for local 
population and province dummies, without the gender-education interaction term. Each 
column represents a separate ordered probit regression corresponding to the five outcome 
variables identified in Tables 1A to 1C. Higher values of the outcome variables in columns 
(1) to (3) correspond to higher support for militant groups, and lower values correspond to 
lower support for militant groups. Higher values of the feelings toward the United States 
variable (column 4) correspond to more unfavorable views of the U.S. Higher values of the 
support Al-Qaeda attacks against the U.S./share al-Qaeda values variable (column 5) 
correspond to higher support for terrorism against the U.S. 
Table 4 shows that women overall seem to be more likely to have positive views 
about terrorist groups relative to men. This result is strongly significant for the Pakistan 
Taliban outcome, as well as for feelings toward bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Women seem to 
have better views of the U.S. and are less likely to support al-Qaeda attacks against the U.S. 
(though not significantly). Older people seem to have lower support for terrorist groups. 
Income is not significantly correlated with support for terrorism, though the signs imply a 
negative relationship. Education is also not significantly correlated with support for 
terrorism, and the results seem mixed in terms of signs. The results in Table 4 largely 
confirm what the existing literature finds, and it is notable that education overall does not 
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3.3 Support for Terrorism, Education, and Gender 
Table 5 adds the female-education interaction to the baseline regression, along with 
personal religiosity, and terrorist events in the district. Note that the coefficients are not 
marginal effects and therefore I will discuss only the sign and the significance, and will 
discuss magnitudes after presenting the marginal effects regressions in Table 7. The bottom 
line from the results is that as women become more educated, they show lower support for 
militant and terrorist groups relative to similarly educated men, while uneducated women 
show higher support for militancy and terrorism relative to uneducated men. However, views 
of the United States become more negative, and support for terror attacks against the U.S. 
increases, for more educated women relative to similarly educated men.  
Note that, in this interaction specification, the coefficient on the independent variable 
‘female’ is to be interpreted as the difference between uneducated (or illiterate) women and 
illiterate men. The coefficient on the female-education interaction term reflects on women as 
their education increases relative to similarly educated men. Column (1) shows that 
uneducated women are likely to think that the Taliban taking over control of Pakistan would 
be a better thing relative to uneducated men, but the education of women reverses this 
relationship.  
Columns (2) and (3) show that more educated women (relative to similarly educated 
men) tend to have more negative feelings for both bin Laden and al-Qaeda, whereas 
uneducated women are more likely to have positive feelings toward both the individual and 
the group, relative to uneducated men
viii
. Columns (4) and (5) show that more educated 
women (relative to similarly educated men) tend to have more negative views of the U.S. and 
are more supportive toward al-Qaeda attacks on it, whereas uneducated women have more 
positive feelings of the U.S. relative to uneducated men. In addition, I analyzed the three 
response options for the support for terror attacks against the U.S. variable as dummy 
outcome variables. The separate regressions show that the effect in column (5) stems from 
the support al-Qaeda attacks against the U.S./share al-Qaeda values response, rather than the 
other two responses to the question (oppose attacks/share values or oppose both). That is, 
more educated women are strongly more likely to choose the support/share response relative 
to similarly educated men, while uneducated women are less likely to choose that response 
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relative to uneducated men. I will discuss possible explanations for these results in Section 
3.7.  
It is clear that not considering education for men and women separately conceals an 
important relationship between education and opinions on militancy
ix
. In fact, the baseline 
results in Table 4 without the interaction term do show that women are more supportive of 
terrorism; in light of the results in Table 5, this is explained by the fact that women on 
average are less educated than men. 
Personal religiosity, which is added as a control variable in this regression, is coded 
as a binary variable. The variable religious is set to one if the respondent says he is very 
religious, and set to zero if the respondent chooses one of somewhat, not very, or not at all 
religious as a response (see Table 3B). The results in Table 5 show that higher religiosity is 
highly positively correlated with positive views of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, and with 
negative opinions of the U.S. This is in contrast to the current literature which argues that 
religiosity is uncorrelated with support for militancy (Shapiro and Fair 2010). Note that 
income is mostly uncorrelated with support for terrorism, although those with higher incomes 
are marginally (at the 10% significance level) more likely to support al-Qaeda attacks against 
the U.S. 
Finally, the number of people wounded in terror attacks in the district in the year prior 
to the survey is accounted for using data from the Global Terror Database. Local terror 
attacks appear uncorrelated with individuals’ support for terrorism or views of the U.S. The 
results are very similar if the number killed in terror attacks is used instead of the number 
wounded (results not shown in Table 5).  
3.4 Gender and Education Levels 
Since the respondents’ education is measured as an ordinal categorical variable, I 
separate out the education levels and identify which levels in particular underlie the female-
education effect identified above. In Table 6, I separate out the education term into separate 
dummy variables, leading to five female-education level interaction terms, for each of the 
different levels of education (with illiterate as the reference category): elementary or less, 
some secondary, secondary, some college, and college. The regression run is the same as in 
Table 5, with age, income, personal religiosity, local population, district terrorism, and  
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province dummies also accounted for, but age, income, and education are treated as 
categorical variables in this regression. The results show that the differences between the 
opinions of educated women and men are driven primarily by some high school, high school, 
and some college education years; that is, women with these levels of education become less 
supportive toward terrorist groups (but more supportive of al-Qaeda attacks on the U.S.) 
relative to men with these levels of education. This provides an important insight into where 
the effects emerge, and narrows down the focus for future research on the topic.  
3.5 Marginal Effects 
Tables 7A though 7E present marginal effects coefficients for each of the five ordered 
probit regressions from Table 5. Each regression (for each outcome variable) is represented 
in a separate table, with the columns containing each of the response options for that 
question. I report the marginal effects on female, education, and the female-education 
interaction term. The marginal effect on the female-education interaction term can be 
interpreted as the increase in the likelihood of women relative to men identifying a particular 
response as they (both genders) move up one education level (say, from elementary to some 
secondary, some secondary to secondary). In addition, the coefficient on female can be 
interpreted as the increase in the likelihood of uneducated or illiterate women relative to men 
identifying a particular response.     
To illustrate, I interpret the magnitudes for Table 7C, the feelings toward al-Qaeda 
response (the results are similar for the other outcome variables).  Relative to uneducated 
men, uneducated women are 14% more likely to have a very positive view of al-Qaeda, 22% 
more likely to have a somewhat positive view of al-Qaeda, and 8% more likely to have a 
mixed view of al-Qaeda. They are 9% less likely to have a somewhat negative view of al-
Qaeda, and 35% less likely to have a very negative view of al-Qaeda. With an increase in 
education (of one level), women, relative to men, are 3% less likely to have a very positive 
view of al-Qaeda, 5% less likely to have a somewhat positive view of al-Qaeda, 2% less 
likely to have a mixed view of al-Qaeda, 2% more likely to have a somewhat negative view 
of al-Qaeda, and 7% more likely to have a very negative view of al-Qaeda.   
The numbers in the other tables can be interpreted similarly. The tables all show that 
as women become more educated, relative to similarly educated men, they are less likely to 
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choose responses supporting militant groups and more likely to respond with lack of support 
for militancy. Uneducated women, on the other hand, are more likely to respond supporting 
terror groups and less likely to show a lack of support for terrorism relative to uneducated 
men. However, these relationships reverse when it comes to views of the U.S: educated 
women are more likely to have unfavorable opinions of the U.S. and to support al-Qaeda 
attacks against the U.S. relative to similarly educated men, whereas uneducated women have 
more favorable opinions of the U.S. and are less likely to support al-Qaeda attacks against 
the U.S. relative to uneducated men. 
3.6 Predicted Value Graphs 
Figure 2 is a set of five graphs which display the regression results visually. I recode 
the outcome variables as binary, to be interpreted directly as support for terrorism, and then 
re-run the ordered probit regressions (exactly as in Table 5). The predicted values for each 
outcome variable are calculated for each category of education and gender using the fitted 
regressions, and their average is displayed in the graphs.  
The graphs confirm the main result visually: as women become more educated, their 
support for terrorism declines. For men, education moves their support upward. In addition, 
as women become more educated, their views of the United States become less favorable and 
their support for terrorism against the United States increases. As men become more 
educated, their views of the U.S. become more favorable, but their support for terrorism 
against the U.S. does not change much.  
These graphs suggest that the relationship of female education with support for 
terrorism and opinions on the U.S. is more than just relative to men: in many instances, it is 
an absolute relationship, with women’s education associated with reduced support for 
terrorism and unfavorable opinions of the U.S., and men’s education associated with higher 
support for terrorism and favorable opinions of the U.S. 
3.7 Explaining Views of the United States  
At first glance, the results on the views of the United States and attitudes towards al-
Qaeda attacks on the United States constitute a puzzle, relative to the other results on views 
of militancy in general and of terrorism directed at Pakistanis by the Pakistan Taliban. A 
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large literature examines the factors underlying anti-Americanism in the Muslim world, and 
can be divided up broadly into two camps, one which argues that anti-Americanism emerges 
as a response to what America does (its foreign policy), and the other to what America is 
(American culture). Kull (2011) summarizes polling data and focus group interviews from a 
set of Muslim countries, including Pakistan, to support the former case. The argument is that 
Muslim anger at America stems from the perception that the United States wields coercive 
force on the Muslim world, undermining democracy in these countries and compromising 
their sovereignty, in order to further its own political and economic interests. Given that the 
United States otherwise strongly espouses democratic principles, this perception leads to 
feelings of betrayal and negative views of the U.S. In fact, Kull suggests that in Muslim 
countries, negative feelings against the United States tend to be stronger than negative 
feelings against terrorist groups. This implies that terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda tend to 
garner more sympathy than the United States when asked about in conjunction with the U.S. 
To better understand the views of those who support al-Qaeda attacks against the 
United States and share al-Qaeda’s values, I correlated this dummy variable with a number of 
related questions from the PIPA survey. The correlations show that the respondents who 
support al-Qaeda attacks against the U.S. and share al-Qaeda’s values are more likely to have 
‘very unfavorable’ opinions of the U.S., but do not have better opinions of al-Qaeda in 
general, relative to those who do not support attacks against the U.S. and share al-Qaeda’s 
values. This confirms the notion outlined above that negative feelings toward the United 
States are stronger than views of al-Qaeda, and these negative feelings lead to support for al-
Qaeda attacks against the U.S.  
While those who support attacks against the U.S. are equally likely to say the U.S. 
abuses its power in relations with the Pakistani government (these numbers are very high, 
about 90%, both for those who support attacks against the U.S. and those who do not), they 
are more likely to think the United States purposely humiliates the Muslim world (as opposed 
to the other responses, which are treating it with respect or disrespecting it out of insensitivity 
and ignorance). They are also more likely to say that drone attacks in Pakistan are 
unjustified, and more likely to think that hypothetical U.S. bombings in Pakistan to take out 
al-Qaeda training camps or Taliban bases would not be justified, relative to those who do not 
support attacks against the U.S. However, they are equally likely to disapprove of the NATO 
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mission in Afghanistan or the Obama decision to increase U.S. troops in Afghanistan, 
suggesting that the Afghanistan war does not feature into Pakistani support for terror attacks 
against the U.S. 
Following on this, negative views of the United States can be explained by the 
following logic. More educated women might become more aware of perceived or actual 
violations of Pakistani sovereignty, such as drone attacks targeting militants near the 
Pakistan-Afghanistan border (which also result in civilian casualties). They may feel strongly 
against such violations, and may highly value Pakistani autonomy and freedom. Is it 
education or factors correlated with education which drive these differences in opinions of 
the U.S? I will return to this following a discussion of correlated factors and causal channels 
in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.  
3.8 Perception of Threats: Relation with Terrorism 
In Table 8, I regress the perception of threats posed by various militant groups to 
Pakistan on the explanatory variables of interest: gender, education, income, religiosity, age, 
community population and district terror attacks. While a lower perception of militant threats 
to Pakistan is not directly interpretable as support for terrorism, I am particularly interested in 
seeing if perceptions change after local terror attacks. Recall from Table 1D that the 
questions specifically ask about the threats posed by Islamic militants and local Taliban, by 
al-Qaeda, and by religious militant groups as a whole. While the perceptions of threats posed 
by these groups are at best weakly related with demographics (the female-education results 
are marginally insignificant), there is a significant relationship with local terrorism. In 
particular, terrorist incidents in the district increase the perception of threats posed by the 
Taliban as well as al-Qaeda. This shows that individuals have a rational response to local 
terrorist events, which is to increase their perception of the threat posed by these specific 
groups, but not by religious militant groups in general. This implies that there is a role for 
information campaigns to inform the public about local and regional terrorist attacks and the 
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4 Robustness 
4.1 Social Desirability Bias 
Social desirability bias, which occurs when individuals choose socially desirable 
responses to survey questions, is of particular concern with survey data on sensitive 
questions. Men and women, as well as people of different education levels, have been shown 
to vary in their desire to choose socially appropriate responses, even if their underlying views 
may actually be similar. Failing to account for social desirability bias can lead analysts to the 
mistaken conclusion that men and women or people with varying education levels have 
different views. However, this bias cannot explain the results in this paper, which show 
different responses not just for men and women or for people with different education levels, 
but for educated women relative to educated men and uneducated women relative to 
uneducated men. 
4.2 Female X Something Else? 
Could another observable factor, correlated with women’s education, be driving the 
female education results? Age, income, and community population are three possible factors. 
Specifically, could the results be driven by differences between younger women and men, 
rather than educated women and men? Could they be driven by the differences between 
richer women and men rather than educated women and men? Finally, could they be driven 
by the differences between urban women and men? To check that this is not the case, I used 
two informal tests. First, I replaced the female-education interaction term with an interaction 
of female with each of the three variables identified above: age, income, and local 
population. The results are insignificant for the female-age interaction term for all of the 
support for terrorism and views of the U.S. outcome variables. The female-population 
interaction term is significant for two outcome variables out of five: support for al-Qaeda 
attacks against the U.S. and views of al-Qaeda. The female-income interaction term is 
significant for one outcome variable out of five: support for al-Qaeda attacks against the U.S. 
Given these results (available on request), community population or income alone cannot 
explain our entire set of female education results. 
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Second, I added the female-new variable interaction term to the specification in Table 
5, with the female-education interaction. The female-education effect remains strong and 
significant, while the female-new variable effect is insignificant for age and income for all 
five outcome variables. The female-population term is significantly related to support for al-
Qaeda attacks against the U.S. and the views of al-Qaeda, but the female-education term 
remains significantly related to these variables as well. Taken together, these results show 
that the female-education effect is not driven by age, income, or community population. 
In Section 5.3, I undertake a more formal test (following Altonji Elder Taber 2005) 
which uses correlation with all the observables to assess whether correlation with unobserved 
factors could explain the results. 
5 Explaining the Empirical Results 
We have established empirically that there is a strong gender dimension to the 
relationship between education and opinions on terrorism. There are two competing 
hypotheses which could explain these results. The first is that girls who get educated are 
different in some way from boys who get educated, and the factors which drive the difference 
in education also explain lower support for terrorism. This implies that what we have 
observed is a correlation, and to tackle support for terrorism one must target these omitted 
factors. The second is that the (content or quality of) education of boys and girls is different 
in some way, and this drives the differences in support for terrorism. This is a causal story, 
and implies that we must target and aim to increase the education of girls, at least getting as 
many as possible to a high school degree and a few years beyond. In addition, we must aim 
to understand what works for girls’ education and make the requisite changes in boys’ 
education.  
The next two sections discuss the case for correlation and causation respectively, and 
in section 5.3 I use the Altonji Elder Taber (2005) selection on unobservables method to 
disentangle whether correlation or causation is more likely to be behind the results. In doing 
this, I break ground: the literature examining the determinants of support for terrorism to date 
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5.1 The Case for Correlation 
The first hypothesis is that the difference between educated girls and boys is driven 
by an omitted variable (or variables), such as belonging to different types of families. Across 
the literature, the main variable that emerges as a differentiating factor affecting the 
enrollment of girls, and not of boys, in Pakistan is mothers’ education (Lloyd, Mete, and 
Grant (2005, 2007), Andrabi et al (2007))
x
. It is plausible that differences in the opinions of 
educated women (relative to men) could be driven by the influence of their educated mothers 
and their views, rather than learning from their own schooling. Similarly, differences in the 
opinions of uneducated women (relative to men) could be driven by the influence of their 
uneducated mothers. However, having mothers’ education as an omitted variable implies that 
we must target our original variable of interest, the education of girls, but means that it may 
perhaps take up to a generation for the full effects to manifest themselves.  
As argued earlier, belonging to a progressive or liberal family might be the relevant 
omitted variable, since such families may be more likely to educate their daughters and also 
have lower tolerance or support for militant groups (conversely, conservative families may 
be less likely to educate their daughters and also have higher tolerance or support for 
terrorism). This factor may matter less for the education of boys, which would then explain 
the female-education results, since these results are for (educated or uneducated) women 
relative to (educated or uneducated) men. What creates a ‘liberal’ household? If female 
education is one important factor (as seems plausible) in making families more progressive, it 
is still an important variable on which to focus. Note that we have accounted for religiosity, 
which may be correlated with liberalism. 
The above are household level factors that may influence the education of girls more 
than that of boys and may help explain support for terrorism. Next, I will discuss individual 
level factors that may differentiate educated women from men. Two such factors could be 
intelligence and hard work. These two variables may be much more influential for whether or 
not a girl gets educated than whether a boy gets educated (there is some evidence that parents 
educate their most intelligent daughters in the Pakistani context, but this factor matters less 
for boys, who are more likely to get educated anyway (Andrabi et al 2007)). Intelligence and 
hard work could in turn drive more progressive opinions on terrorism by encouraging 
questioning of terrorist group rhetoric, motives, and methods. There is in fact evidence that 
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enrolled girls spend more time studying at home than boys, who play more (Andrabi et al 
2007; this is true in countries other than Pakistan as well), so hard work may be a factor in 
explaining the results. Because the above builds on the fact that there is a selection on 
motivation and intelligence in the education of girls that is more acute than in the education 
of boys, the fact that uneducated women, relative to uneducated men, are more likely to 
support terrorist groups, can also be explained by this.  
A third set of omitted factors may be personal interactions and non-educational 
information sources, which may be different for men and women, and also correlated with 
their education. These personal interactions and sources of information may help shape the 
opinions of uneducated men and women, as well as educated men and women. In Pakistan, 
educated and uneducated boys and men get their information from informal gatherings with 
other men in the town or the village, which focus on hearsay and rhetoric. Terrorist groups 
may preach to and directly recruit men in these locations as well. Women are limited much 
more to indoor spaces in many parts of the country (and are not preached to by militant 
groups), and talk less about politics with other women. The information source for educated 
women is thus likely not other women, but could be what they learnt in school, books and 
newspapers (and perhaps television), which may help them make informed decisions relative 
to educated men, who focus more on their informal interactions to form opinions. However, 
using this explanation, it is less clear why the opinions of uneducated women, which may be 
based on hearsay from men, are more supportive of terrorism than those of uneducated men. 
The differences in opinions on the U.S. and support for attacks against the U.S. can 
also be explained by any of the factors highlighted above: omitted variables such as 
intelligence or belonging to a liberal or progressive household, or personal interactions or 
sources of information such as the media could make educated women more aware of 
violations of Pakistan’s sovereignty and drive opinions against the United States. 
5.2 The Case for Causation 
The second hypothesis is that the education of boys and girls itself is different in 
some way. Such differences are likely to stem from differences between girls’ public schools 
and boys’ public schools, such as variations in how male and female teachers teach. I focus 
here on public schools, since they form a majority of the education landscape (and did more 
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so at the time the PIPA sample was educated) and also because they are segregated in terms 
of gender. In addition, the recent expansion of private schools is still an elementary education 
phenomenon, and the years around high school (where the female-education results stem 
from) are still largely concentrated in the public schooling system
xi
.  
There is some evidence that women are better teachers, in that their students perform 
better on standardized assessments (in a survey done by the Social Action Program, cited in 
Andrabi et al 2007; the standardized assessments test language and math, not opinions, of 
course). This is despite some evidence that (female) teachers in girls’ schools have fewer 
years of teaching experience and are more likely to be absent than (male) teachers in boys’ 
schools (Lloyd, Mete, and Grant 2005). In addition, the exact content taught by male and 
female teachers could differ, although the curriculum is the same by law, and the textbooks 
are the same as well
xii
. Understanding whether and how male and female teachers impart 
lessons and knowledge differently to their respective students is an important avenue for 
future research. Given my empirical results, we can choose to focus on secondary school and 
a few years beyond. Understanding what works in girls’ schooling and what does not in 
boys’ schooling will not only help direct the focus on girls’ schooling, but also help inform 
how to reform boys’ schooling and male teaching to improve opinions on terrorism. 
It is important to note here again, as I did in the introduction, that the policies of the 
Taliban and militant groups in Pakistan adversely affect educated women in particular. 80% 
of Pakistanis in this survey respond that the Pakistan Taliban does not allow girls to go to 
school and women to go to work, and 65% respond that they do not allow children to be 
vaccinated in the areas in which the Pakistan Taliban wields control. Given this, one could 
think that the education of women is not different per se, but that more educated women are 
more affected by and hence more likely to oppose the Taliban’s policies. However, note that 
the effects I find are very strong for the questions which look at terrorism outside Pakistan 
(al-Qaeda and attacks against the U.S.); since al-Qaeda is less likely to affect the lives of 
educated Pakistani women differently than men, the ‘policies’ explanation does not suffice to 
explain the entire set of results.   
Again, the differences in opinions on the U.S. and support for attacks against the U.S. 
can be explained by differences in girls’ and boys’ schooling and teaching by male and 
female teachers, if girls’ schools and teachers focus more on Pakistan’s sovereignty. 
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5.3 Correlation or Causation? Using Selection on Observables as a Guide to the 
Selection on Unobservables 
Using a well-established approach from the economics literature, developed and 
formalized by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005), this section will attempt to quantitatively 
assess whether the results in this paper are more likely to reflect correlation or causation. The 
basic logic is as follows: the main variable of interest, which is likely to be endogenous, is 
correlated with the observed control variables, and also with some unobserved variables. In 
our case, the female-education interaction (as well as the variable female, which represents 
uneducated women) is possibly correlated with some unobservables as outlined in Section 
5.1. We can calculate the exact influence of observed control variables on female education. 
Then, assuming that the observed variables are a random subset of a larger set of observed 
and unobserved variables, we can use that number to calculate how much larger the influence 
of omitted variables on female education needs to be (relative to the influence of the 
observed variables) to explain away the entire result. If this ratio is large, we can conclude 
that the selection on the unobserved variables must be much larger than the selection on the 
observed or control variables, which would be unlikely, and hence would support the 
causation story. 
Following Bellows and Miguel (2009), I derive the unobserved selection to observed 
selection ratio below, extending it to the case with two variables: Female, representing 
uneducated women relative to men, and Female x Educ, representing educated women 
relative to men. Recall the main specification with controls: 
                                        (           )  
                                                                  (1) 
with the coefficients now subscripted ‘C’ to denote that the specification includes controls. U 
denotes unobserved variables. Consider the following specification with the variables female 
and education, and their interaction, but without the other controls: 
                            (           )          (2) 
where       , U denotes unobserved variables, and X denotes the observed control 
variables: age, income, religiosity, local population, district terrorism and province dummies. 
The bias on the coefficient g in the specification without controls is:  
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   (            )
   (           )
        (3) 
where    is the true relationship between female-education and the outcome  .  
The bias on the coefficient g in the specification with controls is: 
           
   (            )
   (           )
          (4)  
Subtracting (2) from (1):  
       
   (              )
   (           )
  
If the true effect is driven to       
  
      
 
   (            )
   (              )
                (5) 
 Note that the RHS represents the relationship between the omitted variables and girls’ 
education relative to the relationship between the observed control variables and girls’ 
education. The LHS is calculated using the coefficients from the regressions (1) and (2) 
above. If this ratio is larger than one, ‘selection’ on unobservables needs to be greater than 
selection on unobservables to explain away the entire effect. Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) 
argue that the larger it is, the more plausible a causal story (they use a ratio of 3.55 to argue 
for causation). 
Similarly: 
            
   (               )
   (             )
 
where    is the true relationship between uneducated females and    
           
   (               )
   (             )
 
       
   (                )
   (             )
 
If         
  
      
 
   (              )
   (                )
         (6) 
 Note that the RHS of (6) represents the relationship between the omitted variables 
and uneducated women relative to the relationship between the observed control variables 
and uneducated women. For each of the five main outcome variables measuring support for 
militancy, the ratios defined in equations (5) and (6) are displayed in Table 9. The ratios are 
very large and suggest that a causal story is indeed plausible.  
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6 Conclusion 
This paper uses a number of novel approaches to examine how education is related to 
support for terrorism and militancy in Pakistan. Various dimensions of support for militancy 
are examined, including views of a militant group that primarily affects Pakistani civilians, as 
well as groups which affect the United States. This paper establishes a critical empirical 
relationship: men and women think differently about militancy, and it is something plausibly 
in their education which affects their views. This effect particularly seems to emerge from 
the years spent in secondary school and beyond. In contrast to the current literature which 
puts education on the back burner when it comes to understanding support for terrorism, the 
empirical results established here put education, especially that of girls, back into the 
spotlight. A great deal of research has shown that educating girls is important for various 
household outcomes, including child and maternal health, and income. That it matters in 
reducing support for terrorism is new information. Given that the support of the family (and 
mothers) is important for new recruits as well as terrorists embarking on suicide missions, the 
gender dimension identified in this paper is especially important: educated women can 
prevent their sons and family members from joining terrorist groups and participating in 
attacks. Giving educated women more of a voice or a non-threatening platform where they 
can articulate and logically explain their views on militancy could be an important strategy in 
countering support for terrorism.  
This paper is the first to study the determinants of support for terrorism together with 
views of the United States, and thus also yields important insights about how support for 
terrorism relates to anti-Americanism. As women become more educated, their views of the 
U.S. become more unfavorable and their support for terrorism against the U.S. increases, 
even as their support for overall militancy and terrorism, and that directed against Pakistan, 
declines. This important finding suggests that any broad educational de-radicalization efforts 
will not automatically help the United States in winning over Pakistani hearts and minds. To 
the contrary, as educated women achieve a better understanding of the problems of militancy 
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I deliberately do not recommend specific policy interventions in girls’ and boys’ 
education, because the data I use cannot offer direct insights into that. Further research is 
required to understand the exact mechanism underlying the empirical relationship I establish. 
This research must focus on several of the potential mechanisms highlighted in this paper: 
teaching by male and female teachers, especially in high schools; the selection of boys and 
girls into schooling, whether due to family or individual factors; and better understanding 
how girls and boys absorb information and interact with their peers and family members. In 
particular, we need to develop an understanding of what is working in girls’ education in 
order to recommend changes in boys’ education.  
In future research, I plan to add questions onto a large scale household survey (which 
is a long-term panel, already in the field for its first iteration), to control for family and 
household level variables, supply side factors such as access to schooling, parental 
perceptions of their children’s ability, etc. This will enable me to account for factors 
unobserved in this analysis. In addition, I plan to undertake a small-scale, in-depth qualitative 
survey in schools, asking male and female teachers (and their students) about views on 
militancy, sitting through lessons on history and politics, going through textbooks and lesson 
plans, and questioning male and female students about their sources of information, their 
personal interactions and their families. 
These results also have important implications for other countries where education is 
segregated by gender: education in these contexts may result in varying opinions and 
perceptions by gender. Ultimately, this is an empirical approach which may help shed light 




  29 
 
Figure 1: Public Opinion by Education Level 





































































I E SS S SC C
 
 
  30 
 
Figure 2: Predicted Value Graphs 
Note: Average predicted values of each outcome in each gender and education category, 
using ordered probit regressions of the outcome on gender, education, genderXeducation, 
income, age, religiosity, local population, province dummies, and number wounded in terror 
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Table 1: Outcome Variables 









Table 1B - Feelings toward Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda 
 Osama bin Laden Al-Qaeda 
Very positive 9.23 5.41 
Somewhat positive  14.10 21.66 
Mixed  31.98 16.39 
Somewhat negative 17.99 22.72 
Very negative 14.64 21.48 
DK/NR 12.05 12.34 
 
Table 1C - Views of the U.S. and al-Qaeda attacks 
 View of current 
U.S. govt 
 How do you feel about  
al-Qaeda 
Very favorable 11.81 
Support attacks against 





Oppose attacks against 





Oppose attacks against 
U.S. – don’t share 
values 
28.06 
Very unfavorable 57.55   
DK/NR 5.55 DK/NR 12.92 
 
If Pakistan Taliban were to 
gain control over all of 
Pakistan, would this be 
mostly good or mostly bad? 
Very good  4.93  
Somewhat good  12.54  
Somewhat bad  7.92  
Very bad  66.77  
Don't Know/Refused  7.84  
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Table 1D: Perception of Threats to Pakistan in 10 years 
 





years?   
Activities of Islamist 
militants and local 
Taliban in FATA and 
settled areas  
Activities of Bin 
Laden's tanzeem, al-
Qaeda  
Activities of religious 
militant groups  




13.98 12.37 18.23 
Not a threat  2.29 2.06 11.01 
DK/Ref  3.28 3.32 3.85 
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Table 2A: Education – PIPA Respondents (and Census) 
 Education Level  PIPA (% of respondents)*  1998 Census**  
Illiterate  23.47  
48.44 
Elementary school or less  12.91  
Some Secondary School  24.65  20.90  
Completed Secondary School  25.78  17.29  
Some College  10.30  6.97  
Completed University  2.24  5.96  
DK/Ref  0.64  
 
 
Table 2B: Literacy Ratios by Gender 
 
1998 Census**  
PIPA 2009 
respondents*  
Total  43.92  74.07  
Male  54.81  87.45  
Female  32.02  59.06  
 
Table 2C: Education by Gender – PIPA* 
 
Male  Female Total 
Illiterate  14.21  34.67  23.62  
Elementary school or less  12.97  13.02  12.99  
Some Secondary School  29.09  19.79  24.81  
Completed Secondary School  29.35  21.96  25.95  
Some College  10.92  9.72  10.37  
Completed University  3.46  0.85  2.26  
 






Table 3A: PIPA Summary Statistics for Respondents’ Age and Income 
Age  % of respondents 2009 Monthly 
Household Income  
(Pak Rupees) 
% of respondents 
16-29 41.07 <3000 7.05 
30-39 26.75 3001-10000 47.48 
40-49 19.60 10001-15000 26.33 
50-59 8.61 15001-25000 10.46 
60+ 3.98 >25000 0.73 
  Refused 7.94 
 
Table 3B: Personal Religiosity 
 % of respondents 
Very religious 48.50 
Somewhat religious 40.10 
Not very religious 5.40 
Not at all religious 0.30 
DK/NR 5.70 
 
Table 3C: Summary Statistics for GTD Variables and Population 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Total wounded in terror 
attacks in PIPA districts 
76.13 128.67 0 349 
Total killed in terror 
attacks in PIPA districts 
22.26 33.14 0 85 
Local Population (primary 
sampling unit) 


















Views of OBL/ 
al-Qaeda 
Views of U.S. 





















Female  0.660*** 0.417*** 0.493** -0.345 -0.288 
 
(0.23) (0.147) (0.211) (0.247) (0.305) 
Age  -0.028 -0.014 -0.023 0.054 0.078 
 
(0.05) (0.048) (0.038) (0.044) (0.066) 
Income  -0.074 -0.045 -0.136 0.02 0.168 
 
(0.18) (0.103) (0.137) (0.162) (0.104) 
Education  0.047 0.05 0.032 0.04 0.031 
 
(0.06) (0.055) (0.046) (0.042) (0.074) 
# of Obs  848 832 820 882 822 
Ordered probit regressions, with robust standard errors (clustered by district) in 
parentheses.  
Controls included but not shown: population, province dummies.  



















Views of OBL/ 
al-Qaeda 
Views of U.S. 






















Female  1.243*** 0.993*** 1.183*** -1.302*** -0.772** 
 
(0.431) (0.362) (0.212) (0.365) (0.375) 
Age  -0.015 -0.037 -0.054* 0.042 0.07 
 
(0.05) (0.042) (0.03) (0.042) (0.06) 
Income  -0.11 -0.062 -0.139 0.015 0.173* 
 
(0.163) (0.082) (0.091) (0.123) (0.091) 
Education  0.177** 0.117 0.111** -0.150* -0.057 
 
(0.086) (0.104) (0.049) (0.08) (0.075) 
Female*Educ -0.187* -0.193 -0.246*** 0.312*** 0.163*** 
 (0.111) (0.121) (0.069) (0.101) (0.059) 
Religious -0.157 0.345** 0.289*** 0.609*** 0.189 
 (0.182) (0.163) (0.109) (0.15) (0.143) 
Total wounded 
in terror attacks 
0 0 0 0 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
# of Obs  806 789 780 840 785 
Ordered probit regressions, with robust standard errors (clustered by district) in parentheses.  
Controls included but not shown: local population, province dummies.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Total wounded in terrorist attacks: data from the GTD, in the respondents’ district in 2008. The 













Views of OBL/ 
al-Qaeda 
Views of U.S. 





















Female *  0.446 0.243 -0.268 0.12 0.569* 
Elementary (0.542) (0.309) (0.368) (0.378) (0.299) 
Female *  0.038 -0.931*** -0.828*** 0.652** 0.244 
Some 
Secondary 
(0.387) (0.314) (0.236) (0.313) (0.213) 
Female *  -0.755* -0.757* -1.298*** 0.851** 0.707*** 
Secondary (0.421) (0.389) (0.357) (0.416) (0.234) 
Female * -0.205 -0.644 -1.140*** 1.386*** 0.728*** 
Some 
College 
(0.573) (0.461) (0.347) (0.464) (0.226) 
Female *  -1.315 -1.07 -0.474 1.4 0.426 
College (1.131) (0.93) (0.615) (0.91) (0.594) 
# of Obs 806 789 780 840 785 
Ordered probit regressions, with robust standard errors (clustered by district) in parentheses.  
Controls included but not shown: female, age, income, education, religiosity, population, 
province dummies, number wounded in district in terror attacks in 2008. Omitted education 
category is illiterate.  





Table 7: Marginal effects coefficients based on regressions in Table 5 
(Controls not shown) 
A: Pakistan Taliban control Very good Somewhat good Somewhat bad Very bad 
Female 0.1327** 0.1342** 0.0879*** -0.3548*** 
 (0.0608) (0.0528) (0.0284) (0.1253) 
Education 0.0189* 0.0191** 0.0125** -0.0504** 
 (0.0111) (0.0095) (0.0055) (0.0244) 
FemalexEducation -0.0200 -0.0202 -0.0133* 0.0535* 
 (0.0141) (0.0127) (0.0075) (0.0328) 
 








Female 0.1674*** 0.1264** 0.0444** -0.1145** -0.2237*** 
 (0.0557) (0.0628) (0.0222) (0.0483) (0.0836) 
Education 0.0197 0.0149 0.0052 -0.0135 -0.0264 
 (0.0169) (0.0144) (0.0050) (0.0129) (0.0228) 
FemalexEducation -0.0325* -0.0245 -0.0086 0.0222 0.0434 
 (0.0195) (0.0176) (0.0064) (0.0149) (0.0274) 
 










Female 0.1386*** 0.2176*** 0.0750** -0.0860** -0.3452*** 
 (0.0413) (0.0501) (0.0320) (0.0379) (0.0677) 
Education 0.0130* 0.0203** 0.0070* -0.0080* -0.0323** 
 (0.0071) (0.0083) (0.0042) (0.0048) (0.0141) 
FemalexEducation -0.0288*** -0.0452*** -0.0156* 0.0179*** 0.0717*** 
 (0.0095) (0.0120) (0.0090) (0.0063) (0.0236) 
 










Female 0.2111*** 0.1205*** 0.0607*** -0.3924*** 
 (0.0734) (0.0453) (0.0182) (0.1187) 
Education 0.0243* 0.0139 0.0070* -0.0452* 
 (0.0141) (0.0092) (0.0037) (0.0259) 
FemalexEducation -0.0506** -0.0289** -0.0146*** 0.0940*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0128) (0.0054) (0.0337) 
 






Oppose attacks, don’t 
share values 
Female -0.2453** 0.0057 0.2396** 
 (0.1202) (0.0271) (0.1230) 
Education -0.0180 0.0004 0.0176 
 (0.0237) (0.0020) (0.0236) 
FemalexEducation 0.0517*** -0.0012 -0.0505*** 





Table 8: Terrorist Events and the Perception of Threats to Pakistan  
 
Islamist Militants and 
Local Taliban not 
threat 
al-Qaeda not threat 
Religious Militant 
Groups not threat 
Female 0.595 0.61 0.699 0.706 0.398 0.399 
 
(0.553) (0.553) (0.525) (0.522) (0.396) (0.4) 
Age -0.064* -0.066* -0.058 -0.063 -0.077 -0.081* 
 
(0.035) (0.034) (0.053) (0.052) (0.05) (0.048) 
Income -0.118 -0.139* -0.183* -0.199* 0.019 0.009 
 
(0.088) (0.084) (0.108) (0.108) (0.112) (0.112) 
Education 0.143 0.139 0.015 0.009 0.098 0.094 
 
(0.095) (0.093) (0.082) (0.079) (0.083) (0.083) 
Female*Educ -0.211 -0.21 -0.154 -0.157 -0.073 -0.073 
 (0.142) (0.137) (0.115) (0.112) (0.118) (0.119) 
Religious -0.254 -0.297 -0.078 -0.119 -0.166 -0.193 
 (0.202) (0.19) (0.161) (0.157) (0.2) (0.203) 
Wounded in 
Terrorist Attacks 
-0.004***  -0.002***  0  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Killed in 
Terrorist Attacks 
 -0.009*  -0.004  0.001 
  (0.006)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
# of Obs 858 858 857 857 855 855 
Ordered probit regressions, with robust standard errors (clustered by district) in parentheses.  
Controls included but not shown: population, province dummies.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Wounded refers to the total number of people wounded in terrorist attacks in the respondent’s 
district in 2008, using GTD data. Killed refers to the total number of people wounded in terrorist 














Views of OBL/ 
al-Qaeda 
Views of U.S. 






















Female -249.8 -10.194 -13.8 6.198 8.20 




      
, where   is the coefficient on female in the specification with controls, and 




      
, where   is the coefficient on female*educ in the specification with 
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i
 South Asia Terrorism Portal, accessed May 14, 2012 
(http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/).  
ii
 Pakistan’s ex-President Musharraf stated this quite simply in a speech at Stanford in 2009: 
“Poverty, illiteracy cause terrorism” (Palo Alto Online News). The report of the 9/11 Commission 
(2004) also states that “Pakistan’s endemic poverty, widespread corruption, and often ineffective 
government create opportunities for Islamist recruitment. Poor education is a particular concern.” 
iii
 The report of the CGD Study Group on Pakistan argues that countering terrorism should not be 
considered the main goal of aid to Pakistan; development should. 
iv
 A related literature examines terrorism risk at the country level and finds that poverty and lack 
of education fail to predict terrorist events (Krueger and Maleckova 2003, Krueger and Laitin 
2008, Abadie 2003).  
v
 In this analysis, Krueger does not use respondent-level data and thus only reports basic cross-
tabulations. Based on his conclusion, he recommends that counterterrorism policy should focus 
on the content (quality) of education, rather than its quantity. He argues that participation in and 
support for terrorism is comparable to voting; that is, the more educated are more opinionated and 
confident about their opinions. 
vi In response to a separate question asking respondents about the Afghan Taliban, 54% of 
respondents think the Afghan Taliban regaining control over Afghanistan would be a very bad 
thing. 
vii
 A secondary school degree in Pakistan is typically a Matriculate degree, obtained after 
completing ten years of schooling and passing a board examination. 
viii
 All the results hold through when I replace population (a continuous measure) with a binary 
urban/rural variable. 
ix
 In another specification, I add squares of both age and income to account for non-linearities in 
these two variables (results available on request). The main results remain the same as before. In 
these specifications, higher incomes make views of al-Qaeda and bin Laden less positive, 
although this effect starts diminishing as incomes increase.  
x
 The focus here is on primary school enrollment. 
xi
 A great deal has been written about public versus private schools in Pakistan (especially 
Andrabi et al 2007 in their long-term LEAPS survey), and there is mounting evidence that (co-
educational) private schools (with primarily local female teachers) are doing a better job in terms 
of educating students relative to public schools (on test scores and even civic values). However, 
the public/private school distinction cannot account for the differences in public opinion that I 
observe in the 2009 PIPA survey between educated men and women. As mentioned earlier, the 
women in the PIPA sample are unlikely to have been affected by an increase in private schools, 
since it has happened starting in the mid-1990s, and has occurred mainly for primary schools 
(whereas the effect I find is driven by the years of education around secondary school). Second, 
the current enrollment ratio for girls in private schools relative to public schools is quite close to 
that of boys: it would need to be much higher to help account for this effect. 
xii
 Hussain et al (2011) argue that public schools and madrassas teach religious discrimination and 
misinform students of the meaning of jihad, but their analysis does not differ by gender. 
